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Abstract 
This paper analyzes the exchange rate in a  "no-arbitrage" or "real business cycle"  equilib-
rium model and provides empirical evidence for this model vis-a-vis PPP. Our contribution 
is to show, based on a generalization of the equilibrium model of exchange rates, that (i) the 
test equation linking the exchange rate to fundamentals should allow for international het-
erogeneity in time preferences or risk attitudes, as well as noise-that is, the model should 
not be tested as an exact relation;  (ii)  empirical work should use levels  of variables rather 
than first  differences;  (iii)  tests on the existence of long-run relations should be comple-
mented  by tests on the signs  of the coefficients;  (i v)  the specification of the regression 
should offer demonstrated advantages over  alternatives,  and the significance tests should 
not rely on asymptotic distributions; and (v)  the tests should steer clear of countries that 
have imposed, for most of the period, capital restrictions or exchange controls, thus violat-
ing the integrated-markets assumption of the model.  Our empirical work shows that, as  a 
long-run relation, the generalized model outperforms PPP. 
JEL classification:  F31 
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A recent class of exchange rate models (called by a variety of names such as  "equilibrium", 
"no-arbitrage", and  "real  business  cycle"  models)  relates the real  exchange rate to real 
consumption,  time preference,  and relative risk  aversion (or  intertemporal substitution). 
Our main objective, in this paper is to extend the existing models. and add fresh empirical 
evidence to extant tests of this model.  This introductory section provides a brief review of 
the theoretical foundations and available empirical results. 
The cornerstone of the equilibrium approach to exchange rates is  the result that, under 
suitable assumptions,  the real exchange rate is  the ratio of the marginal utilities of real 
spending.  1  For instance, Stockman (1980)  and Lucas  (1982)  study the exchange rate in 
a model of an endowment economy with frictionless  markets, where the solution is  of an 
"equilibrium" nature in the sense that it maximizes international aggregate utility.  Dumas 
(1992) applies this equilibrium property of the exchange rate in his analysis of a one-good 
production economy where international trade in goods is  costly2  and where agents have 
constant and identical risk aversions and time preferences.  Sercu,  Uppal, and Van Rulle 
(1995) study an endowment-economy with shipping costs and obtain closed-form solutions 
rather than the numerical results  of Dumas.  Instead  of using  shipping costs  to model 
countries as distinct economic entities, Backus and Smith (1993) derive the exchange-rate in 
a model with one perfectly tradable good and one non-tradable good and CES consumption 
preferences defined over these two goods. 
Other utility-maximizing models often do not refer to this literature. but nevertheless 
fit into the "equilibrium"  category-Stulz (1987), for example, considers a two-country pro-
duction economy with log investors who have a identical Cobb-Douglas preferences defined 
over a  perfectly tradable good and a  non-traded good.  The equilibrium model also nests 
the monetary economies considered in Bakshi and Chen (1997)  and Basak and Gallmeyer 
(1999), where the focus is  on determining the prices of financial securities rather than ex-
pressing the exchange rate in terms of observable variables and relating it to PPP. Bakshi 
IFor a  recent review  of macroeconomic models of the exchange rate see  Devereux  (1997),  Lane (1999). 
and Obstfeld and Rogoff (2000). 
2Empirical support for  the effects of shipment costs has been documented in Engel (1993).  Rogers and 
Jenkins (1995),  and Wei and Parsley (1995).  who  find  that a  significant  proportion of the total variation 
in the real exchange rate arises from deviations from the Law of One Price (LOP). Also. Engel and Rogers 
(1995) show that within-country deviations from LOP are much smaller than cross-country deviations. The exchange rate and PPP  2 
and  Chen assume log  utilities.  lognormal distribut.ions.  and perfect  commodity markets 
where money is  neutral, while  Basak and Gallmeyer characterize the exchange rate in an 
exchange economy with money in the utility function.  In all these models,  market fail-
ures are absent, so that the solution corresponds to (and is  often explicitly based on)  the 
central-planners solution. 
Backus, Foresi and Telmer (1996) generalize the Stockman (1980) and Lucas (1982) mod-
els rather than specializing it.  First, they link the nominal exchange rate to the marginal 
utility of nominal spending, an approach that neatly avoids the assumption, implicit in any 
real-exchange-rate model with more than one good, that utility is  homothetic.  Moreover, 
the Backus et al.  result is  established starting from the notion of no arbitrage in financial 
markets, where the key assumption is that asset markets are frictionless and complete; thus, 
the "equilibrium" model is  robust to market failures in the real economy provided they do 
not invalidate the role of marginal utility as the pricing kernel.3  Sercu and Uppal (2000) 
provide a general first-order decomposition of the change of the nominal exchange rate for a 
wide range of (state-independent) utility functions and economic settings; they also discuss 
the links of the equilibrium model with the PPP hypothesis.  Our contribution on the the-
oretical front is to extend the Sercu and Uppal (2000)  model to allow for state dependent 
utility ftmctions, and more importantly, different rates of time-preference and risk aversion 
across countries and across time. 
Turning now to empirical work, we  first review test of the PPP hypothesis.  Abuaf and 
J orion  (1990)  use Dickey-Fuller tests to establish the presence of mean-reversion in real 
exchange rates, a phenomenon not evident from autocorrelations tests on first-differenced 
data; and Johansen and Juselius  (1992) refine the cointegration techniques in an attempt 
to find long-run relations between exchange rates and relative price levels that may be hard 
to detect in first-differenced data.  Edison, Gagnon, and Melick (1997) show how the power 
of these tests can be improved using the Horvath and Watson (1995) procedure.  Expanded 
data sets have been considered by,  for instance, Frankel and Rose  (1996), Froot, Kim and 
Rogoff  (1995),  Lothian (1997),  Lothian and Taylor (1995),  Wei  and Parsley (1995),  and 
Taylor (1995).  Related work includes Engel, Hendrickson and Rogers (1996) and O'Cormell 
(1998).  A review of the empirical literature on PPP is provided by fj'oot and Rogoff (1995), 
3See  Duffie (1992) for details on this approach to asset pricing.  The pricing-kernel or martingale-pricing 
approach has also  been used to study the relation between exchange rates and international interest rates 
by  Nielsen and Saa-Requejo (1993).  Backus, Foresi and Telmer (1996), and Hollifield and Uppal (1997). The exchange rate and PPP  3 
Nessen (1994) and Rose (1996/7). 
We now review the empirical tests of the equilibrium model of exchange rates.  Backus 
and Smith (1993)  test (and reject)  the hypothesis that the real exchange rate is  an exact 
loglinear function of the real-consumption ratio, by comparing the means, standard devia-
tions,  and auto  correlations of changes in the two time series.  Most tests, however, rely on 
regression analysis, either of differenced data or of levels.  An example of the first type of 
regression is found in the first-pass tests by Koedijk Nissen,  Schotman and Wolff  (1996). 
where they cross-sectionally relate changes in exchange rates to consumption growth rates 
and find  no significant  link.  When subsequently studying panel data at the integrated 
level, Koedijk et al. find evidence broadly consistent with PPP but, again, no traces of any 
consumption effect.  Other tests that analyze levels of the data are cointegration tests as 
provided by,  for instance, Nessen (1994) and Sercu and Uppal (2000).  These tests typically 
find evidence in support of the existence of a long-term relation between nominal exchange 
rates and CPIs, but with a cointegration vector that is incompatible with PPP. In addition, 
in the analysis of quarterly data on five countries by Sercu and Uppal (2000) there appears 
to be a long-run link between the real exchange rate and real consumptions, which seems to 
favor the "equilibrium" model over PPP. However, cointegration tests by Kolhnann (1995) 
on seven countries do not find evidence of such relations.4 
In Section 2,  we start from these empirical studies to come up with a list of desiderata 
for  our own work:  (i)  at the very least, the test equation should allow for  international 
heterogeneity in time preferences  or risk attitudes,  as  well  as  noise--that is,  the model 
should not be tested as an exact relation; (ii)  empirical work should use levels of variables 
rather than first  differences;  (iii)  tests on the existence of long-run relations  should be 
complemented by tests on the signs of the coefficients; (iv) the specification of the regression 
should offer demonstrated advantages over alternatives, and the significance tests should not 
rely on asymptotic distributions; and (v) the tests should steer clear of countries that have 
imposed, for most of the period, capital restrictions or exchange controls, thus violating the 
integrated-markets assumption of the model.  Our empirical work shows that.  as  a  long-
rill1 relation, the generalized model does outperform PPP and that, with one exception, the 
coefficients have the correct sign.  Section 3 describes our data and test procedure.  Section 4 
discusses the empirical results.  We conclude ill Section 5. 
4 Apart from  the base  country,  the US,  the only  country that shows  up in both papers is  Japa.n.  We 
return to the sample selection issue in Section 2. The exchange rate and PPP  4 
2  The model and test design 
This section presents the considerations motivating the design of our test of the RBC model 
of exchange rates.  Let S(t) denote the nominal exchange rate (\lllits of currency 1 per unit 
of currency 2).  Backus  et  al.  (1996)  establish that,  in  an  economy with representative 
consumers and perfect,  arbitrage-free capital markets.  the nominal exchange rate equals 
the ratio of the marginal utilities of nominal spending of country 2 and cO\llltry 1.  That is 
, if cO\llltry k's marginal utility is denoted by mk(t), k =  {1, 2},  then 
S(t) =  m 2(t). 
ml(t) 
(1) 
Let Cdt) denote nominal consumption in country k at time t,  77  the measure of relative 
risk aversion of the representative investor, and IIk(t) the consumption price level in cO\llltry 
k at time t.  If utility is iso-elastic with exponent (1  - 7)),  then the marginal utility of real 
consumption is  (C(t)/II(t))-'l, and the utility of nominal spending is  obtained by dividing 
by II(t).  Rearranging, we  obtain the model for the real rate that is tested by Backus and 
Smith (1992)  and Kollmann (1995): 
S(t)II2(t)  = (C1(t)/II1(t))'l. 
Ih(t)  C2(t)/II2(t) 
(2) 
Given that the above model links the real rate to the consumption ratio, it is sometimes 
called the real business cycle  (RBC) model.  Being more precise than the labels  "equili~ 
rium"  and "no arbitrage,"  we  adopt the RBC name in the remainder of the paper.  Note 
that the prediction is  that higher real consumption abroad  lowers  the real value of the 
foreign currency.  For testing purposes, the standard RBC model is  often written in terms 
of percentage changes  or changes of logs,  see  for  instance Backus  and Smith  (1992)  or 
Kollmann (1995): 
(3) 
To see how  much generality has been lost in the standard RBC equations (2)-(3), we 
now consider a setting that is less restrictive than that considered in the existing literature. 
In general,  the marginal utility of nominal spending in  cO\llltry  k  at dat.e t  is  an indirect The exchange rate and PPP  5 
one, derived from the (static) problem of a consumer who faces a vector of prices for the N 
goods, pdt), and who wishes to allocate a budget of Ck(t) over the consumption of the.se 
goods,  Ck(t)  ==  {Ckt{t),Ck2(t), ... ,CkN(t)}, in order to maximize utility,  Uk(cdt),Xdt),t), 
where X k (t) is a vector of (possibly country-specific) state variables that affect utility.5  This 
problem can be written as: 
where 
V(Ck(t),Pk(t),X(t),t) refers  to the period-t  indirect utility function of total spending, 
given prices, 
Ck(t) denotes the nominal consumption budget, expressed in terms of country k's currency, 
Pk(t) denotes the vector of local-currency price of good j  in country k, Pkj(t), 
Xk (t) denotes the vector of state variables that affect utility in country k, 
Uk(Ck(t), Xdt), t) denotes the utility function of the representative investor in country k. 
and implicitly includes the discounting for time, 
Ck(t) denotes the vector of consumption quantities Ckj(t) of good j  =  {I, ... , N} consumed 
by the representative individual in country k  =  {I, ... , K} at time t. 
Thus, the marginal indirect utility of nominal spending in country k is the multiplier in 
the above optimization problem: 
() - A  (C ()  () X  ()  ) _  8V(Ck(t),Pk(t),Xk(t),t) 
mk  t  - k  k t  ,Pk t,  k t  ,t  - 8Ck(t)  .  (4) 
The change in marginal utility can therefore be decomposed into a  (possibly varying) time-
preference component, growth in real consumption weighted by (possibly varying) relative 
risk aversion, an inflation rate computed from marginal spending weights. and fluctuations 
due to state variables.  The details of this decomposition.  a  generalization of a  result  in 
5The optimal level of Ck(t). itself,  would  be  obtained by  solving the intertemporal problem of the con-
sumer. The exchange rate and PPP  6 
Sercu and Uppal (2000), is provided in the appendix. It then follows from equation (1) that 










[62(t)  - 61(t)] dt  + T/1(t)  (dC1 _  d1h) _ T/2(t)  ( dC2 _  d112) 
'-.-'  C1  111  C2  112 
differential time preference  '  , 
differential RRA-weighted real consumption growth 
+ 
7r1  7r2 
'-v-' 
differential marginal inflation 
~/"  dX1s  _  ~/"  dX2s  +  L~ls X  L~2s X 
8=1  Is  8=1  28 
,  I 
effects of state variables 
(5) 
a 2v, 
aVkl  aCk aCk;t' the semi-elasticity of marginal utility with respect to time, 
that is, the measure of instantaneous time preference, 
Ck  a 2vk  .,.  6 
aVk/  aCk  aCf ' the degree of relative fisk averSIOn, 
N 
L (Ckgkj) dpk] , inflation weighted on the basis of total consumption,  7 and 
j=l  k  Pk] 
t  (aaCc kj Pkj)  dpk] ,inflation weighted on the basis of marginal consumption, 8 
j=l  k  Pk] 
Xks  a2Vk  hl"t  f  'I t'l't  . h  t  t  X  aVk/aCk aCkaXks ' tee  astlcl Y 0  margIna  UI I  Y Wit  respeco  ks· 
Thus, the standard RBC equations (2)-(3) assume that utility is  homothetic as well as 
state-dependent (implying, respectively, dl1k(t)/11klt) = d7rk(t)/7rdt))  and (ks(t)  = 0).  In 
addition, investors are assumed to have equal time preferences 6k  and constant and equal 
relative risk aversions T/k'  A first obvious implicat.ion is that, if the primary issue of interest 
6This definition of relative risk aversion, also adopted by Breeden (1978),  is  a  "real"  measure of relative 
risk aversion  because, when taking partial derivatives with respect to Ck,  we  hold  prices constant.  III  the 
one-good no-inflation case, this definition is  identical to the standard definition, -ck[iJ'Uk/dc%]/[iJUk/dck]. 
'When money is  in the utility function,  as  in  Stulz  (1987),  the interest  rate will  be part of the price 
index, [h. 
8The marginal weights, [8CkJ/8Ck]Pk,j,  sum to unit.y  by virtue of the budget const.raint. The exchange rate and PPP  7 
is  the validity of the general  approach  rather than a highly specialized version  of it, then 
time preferences and risk aversions ought not be restricted to be equal across time, as done 
in Backus and Smith (1992), Kollmann (1995) and Koedijk et  ai,  (1996),  That is, the RCB 
model should be extended to allow for a trend as well as for  differential sensitivity to the 
two cycles, 
Second,  consider the implications of ignoring the difference between marginal- versus 
average-weighted inflation,  One effect  is  that this  introduces  an error-in-variables  bias, 
(reinforcing a similar problem arising from having to use noisy aggregate consumption data), 
But the deviation between the marginal and average inflation rates also implies that the 
relation between the exchange rate, consumption data, and CPIs is no longer exact even if 
risk aversions and time preferences were really constant and identical, and if the assumptions 
of complete markets, consensus  probabilities and representative consumers were actually 
true,  Other potential sources of inexactness that are assumed  away in equation (2)  are 
the variability in the cross-country time-preference differential  and other state variables, 
At best, these omitted variables add noise to the equation, but if they are correlated with 
the regressors then they also induce an omitted-variables bias in the estimates of 5 and ry, 
While there are no obvious cures for  the errors-in-variables and omitted-variables biases, 
the least one can do, in light of equation (5),  is not just to extend the RBC model so as to 
allow for international heterogeneity in the 5s and rys,  but also to allow for  the presence of 
an error term,  This error term in the constant-parameter regression will be autocorrelated 
if the risk- and time-attitude parameters change slowly over time,9 
Koedijk et  al.  (1996)  complement their first-pass regressions on differenced data by a 
thorough analysis of integrated data, which offers more power provided that there is a long-
run relation between the levels of the variables,  Such cointegration tests are provided by, 
amongst others, Kollmann (1995)  and Sercu and Uppal (2000),  While Kollmann finds no 
relation, Sercu and Uppal do,  However, Sercu and Uppal do not establish whether the coin-
tegration vector is consistent with PPP, In the same vein, a long-run relation between real 
exchange rate and real consumption data could still be incompatible with the RBC model 
if the real rate were negatively (positively) related to domestic (foreign) real consumption, 
That is,  while, the generalized RBC model does not give specific rtunlerical values for  the ry 
gNote also that, in the empirical PPP literature, persistent deviations have never been viewed as sufficient 
grounds for  rejection  of PPP, even  though in  the PPP case there a no  grounds to  predict  slowly  moving 
parameters. The exchange rate and PPP  8 
coefficients, we do know that relative risk aversion should be positive,  Thus, we complement. 
the available cointegrat.ion tests by estimating the magnitude and testing the sign of the 
coefficients (obtained from integrated data). 
The new issue that arises immediately is about the regression specification and signif-
icance level to use,  Koedijk  et  al.  chose a  specification that corresponds to the standard 
VAR/ECM equation for  first differences of Set) except that also the contemporaneous in-
flation rates show up on the right  hand side.  They do not discuss  any alternatives.  A 
paper that does so,  at great depth, is  by Phillips and Loretan (1991), that sets up exten-
sive Monte-Carlo experiments for  various possible specifications of the equation.  The one 
that performs the best contains the regressor as an integrated variable rather than in first-
differenced form.  Suppose, for  simplicity of notation, that one wishes to study a  relation 
yet) = AX(t).  The Phillips-Loretan equations would then be non-linear relations of the 
type 
yet)  AX(t) + a+l[Y(t + 1) - AX(t + 1)] + a-dY(t - 1) - AX(t - 1)] 
+ b_1[X(t) - X(t - 1)] + C_l[Y(t) - yet - 1)] +  e(t)  (6) 
with additional leads and lags if required on empirical or a priori grounds.  Thus, we adopt 
this form for our test equation.  Phillips and Loretan also show that, especially in very large 
samples, with this regression specification the standard inferences from the usual t-tests are 
not flagrantly misleading.  In our case,  however,  the sample (87 quarterly observations) is 
far from large.  Thus, our inferences  are based on extensive Monte-Carlo experiments set 
up under three alternative versions  of the null of no  relation between real  rate and real 
spending.  The details are provided in the next section. 
Having chosen the empirical test specification, the next step is  to select the data series. 
Both Backus and Smith (1993)  and Koedijk  et al.  (1996)  consider over twenty countries, 
while Kollmann (1995) considers seven.  We choose five countries for  the following reason. 
Among the countries studied in the three above papers, about 80 percent of the countries 
restricted international financial  flows  at some point in time,  and many did so until the 
early nineties.10  These measures can be comparatively mild,  like the two-tier exchange 
rates adopted in Belgium for over 45  years. in the UK during much of the eighties, and for 
a  brief period also in Italy.  Other measures have been more obstructive, like licenses or 
other restrictions (all Southern EU countries including France; also Ireland. Japan), or even 
lOSee  IFS~ various  issues. for  reviews of exchange restrictions and  the like. The exchange rate and PPP  9 
full  ba!1.B  on foreign portfolio investment (all Nordic cmmtries, and most NICs and LDCs) 
Especially the more drastic restrictions make a mockery of tests of a model that assumes 
perfectly integrated financial markets.  Some of the countries with good records in this field 
have been tracking Germany too closely to provide much additional information,  and/or 
have few  world-class firms  that effectively attract international investors.  In the end, we 
decided to select the four large economies whose currencies dominate the foreign exchange 
market and whose securities dominate the world stock market:  the USA; the UK, despite a 
dual exchange rate in the early eighties; Germany; and Japan, despite its exchange controls 
prior to 1982; and, Switzerland, a mainstream non-ERM economy with unrestricted capital 
flows. 
In the next two sections, our objective is  to evaluate the generalized RBC model, that 
is,  the Backus-Smith equation extended so as  to allow for  noise as well  as  different time-
preference and risk-aversion parameters across countries: 
(7) 
where 6. is the difference of the time preference parameters, per quarter.  The performance 
of the generalized RBC model is measured relative to is  PPP (that is,  where 6.  =  1)1  =  0 
=  1)2), and we  use data in levels rather than first  differences.  Our approach is  similar to 
what has become standard in the empirical literature on PPP: rather than requiring that 
equation (7) hold exactly at any given date, we verify whether the variables identified in the 
model have an influence on the exchange rate in the long run. If  we succeed in doing so, then 
PPP does not provide the best possible explanation of long-run exchange-rate behavior. 
3  Data, estimation procedure, and significance tests 
Our data are quarterly consumption spending series,  CPI data in the last month of the 
quarter, and end-of-quarter exchange rate data from IFS for t.he United States (US), Japan 
(JP), Germany (DE), the United Kingdom (UK),  and Switzerland (CR), over the period 
1974:1  to 1994:IV.  We take the USD  as the reference currency (corresponds to currency 
"1", in the theoretical model) and convert all exchange rates into USD  per unit of foreign 
currency.  In what follows,  the other country is  generally referred to as country k  =  {DE. 
JP, US,  CR}. 
Our regression  specification is  based on  equation  (6).  We found  that  no leads  were The exchange rate and PPP  10 
necessary, and that t.wo  quart.ers  amply s11-fficed  at.  the lag side  Thus, definjng ll/X(t) == 
X(t -l) - X(t -l  -1), the equation is 
Cdt)  cus(t) 
Q  +  (Jot + f3k hl- II  ( ) - f3us In -II  () 
k  t  us  t 
(8) 
{  IIk(t - 1)  Ck(t - 1)  Cus(t - I)} 
+ P  InS(t -1)IIus(t _  1)  - Q  + f3o(t  - 1) + f3k ln IIdt _  1)  - f3us ln IIus(t - 1) 
+  L  L t::..l  (In~L((t))) + L t::..l  (InS(t)gk(t())) +E. 
L=US,k  1=1,2  L  t  1=1,2  US  t 
The first line in (8) is the model stated in levels, from equation (7).  The second line captures 
the first-order autocorrelation, p, in the deviations from the long-run equilibrium.  The third 
line adds lagged changes in the relevant variables to pick up any remaining predictability 
in the error. 
To estimate (8)  we  use Seemingly Unrelated Nonlinear Least Squares, first in bilateral 
estimations  (reported in Table  1)  where  no restrictions are  imposed,  and then in joint-
estimation (Table 2)  where we  restrict the value of f3us  (the estimator of 1)Us)  to be the 
same across  all the countries.  Rather than relying on asymptotic normality,  we  evaluate 
the significance of the t-statistics by means of Monte-Carlo experiments.  In all of the ex-
periments, price and consumption variables are generated on the basis of estimated VARs, 
without an error-correction/cointegration term because Johansen-Juselius tests do not re-
veal  any relation among the five  price series  nor among the five  real-consumption  series 
separately.  Specifically, the five  inflation rates and real-consumption growth rates are first 
estimated, and then simulated, as mutually correlated ARIMA processes.  The simulated 
exchange-rate data, in contrast, are produced by three alternative  "null"  data-generating 
processes,  none of which allows  a  role for  real consumption or a  time trend.  These three 
"null" data-generating processes are: 
(i)  ARIMA: the real exchange rates are assumed to be non-stationary. and follow mutually 
correlated ARIMA (2,1,0)  processes (Roll,  1977). 
(ii)  PPP: the real exchange-rate equation has,  in addition to the VAR  part,  an error-
correction term that links the exchange rate to its PPP value.  Again, the innovations 
are correlated across exchange rates. The exchange rate and PPP  11 
(iii)  Generalized PPP: the procedure is the same as in the previous model, except that now 
the coefficients 8us and 15k  in the error-correction term for the nominal excnange-rate 
equation, ([S(t -1) +  8usITus(t -1) - 8kITk(t -1)), are estimated rather than pre-set 
at unity. This is motivated by the finding of several studies of a cointegration relation 
between S(t), ITus(t) and ITk(t - 1)], with coefficients deviating from unity. 
For each data-generating process  we  simulate 3000  complete 90-quarter,  five-country 
samples (prices, consumptions, and exchange rates), and for  each of these samples we es-
timate equation (8),  either bilaterally (in Table 1)  or with the constraint that f3us,  the 
estimator of 1/us, be identical across equations (in Table 2).  We retrieve the t-statistics for 
each coefficient, rank them, extract simulated percentile values, and provide values for the 
1st, 5th, 10th, 90th, 95th, and 99th percentiles in Tables 1 and 2 under the header "two-sided 
confidence interval for t-statistics" . 
4  Empirical results 
Table  1 provides  the coefficient  estimates from  the bilateral equations.  The header for 
each country-panel gives the autocorrelation in the deviation from the long-run model,  p, 
the R2  corrected for degrees of freedom,l1  and the Durbin-Watson statistic, DW.  For all 
countries we note that the quarterly deviations from the estimated long-term relation are 
quite persistent, with p being around 0.8.  While undoubtedly high,  this p still implies a 
half-life of only four to five quarters, which is encouragingly lower than the half-life of PPP 
deviations estimated to be three to four years in Abuaf and Jorion (1991).  The DWs indicate 
some positive residual autocorrelation.  The left-hand side of each country panel shows the 
estimated coefficients  of the long-run model for  the exchange  rate (f3us  estimating 1/us, 
13k  estimating 1/k,  and 130  estimating the difference in the impatience parameters).  In the 
bilateral estimations, six out of eight 1/-estimates are positive; of the two negative estimat.es. 
only one (for German real consumpt.ion in the DEM equation) is significant..12  The average 
llThis includes the part explained by the heavy autocorrelation. 
12Relative to the standard values, we notice systematically thicker tails in the Monte-Carlo output. Across 
models, the "Generalized PPP" model tends to generate somewhat wider distributions. while across coeffi-
cients the thick tails are especially pronounced for  the time-trend coefficient. The exchange rate and PPP  12 
risk-aversion coefficient is 1.66.13  The time trend is significant for the DEl\-! and GBP, and 
weakly so for the CHF. 
The pattern of rejections are similar across the three alternative "null"  models.  From, 
for example, Abuaf and Jorion (1991) we know that in a sample of a few decades of monthly 
data, mean-reversion is hard to detect.  What our Monte-Carlo experiments indicate is in 
line with this:  the part of exchange-rate changes  picked  up by the PPP error-correction 
model is  too small to have a material impact on the structure of the simulated data.  The 
same appears to hold when we  allow a relation between S(t), IIus(t) and IIk(t - I)J  that 
is more general than PPP: the generalization seems to have only a marginal impact on the 
simulated numbers.  Thus, irrespective of the details of the null, the generalized RBC model 
seems to outperform PPP. 
The estimates in Table 1 does not restrict the relative risk-aversion coefficient for the US 
to be the same across equations.  The X2(3) statistic on this restriction is 7.429, which would 
be significant at the 6% level if the distribution were X2 indeed.  However, simulations reveal 
that the distribution is substantially wider.14  From these simulations, the 95% percentile 
x2-test under the null turns out to be 53.84,  which is  much larger than the asymptotic 
value of 7.815  in well-behaved samples.  Or,  summarizing our results in a different  way: 
when using 7.429 as  the critical  X2  value for  the hypothesis that the data are generated 
by a model with equal US coefficient, we observe not 6% incorrect rejections, but 50%.  In 
short, we cannot reject the hypothesis of a common coefficient for  the US. 
When this common f3us  is  imposed across equations  (in Table 2),  the results do  not 
change substantially.  The average estimate of relative risk aversion across the five estimates 
is virtually unaffected (1.67).  While the estimated coefficient for Japan's real consumption 
loses significance and the estimated coefficient for German real consumption remains signif-
icantly negative, the UK estimate changes sign and becomes positive, and three out of the 
13To avoid weighting the estimate for the US four times instead of only once, we first compute the average 
'TIus  over the four separate estimates (which produces 'TIl'S  =  5.01) and we then compute an equally-weighted 
average of the five country estimates.  This international average is close to the one in Table 2,  where '71.IS  is 
constrained to be equal across all regressions.  A simple average, over all eight estimates. would have been 
2.92 instead of 1.66. 
14Given that the null of the x'-test is that the generalized RBC model holds with a  US coefficient that is 
identical across equations, the simulated samples are now generated by  a generalized RBC model that has 
as its parameters the estimates from Table 2 (that is,  with a common value for  'TIl's).  From each of the 3000 
artificial samples we then estimate the equation without restriction on the US coefficient and we compute a 
standard x2-test for  equality of these coefficients across the four equations. The exchange rate and PPP  13 
four  time-trend coefficients  are now significant.  In short, we  still conclude that both the 
time-trend and risk-aversion have noticeable effects, and in ali cases but one. the estimated 
risk-aversion parameter has the correct sign.  Combined with the conclusions from earlier 
tests on the presence of cointegration relations, we find that long-run PPP does not provide 
the best explanation for  the level  of the exchange rate,  and that even a  very restrictive 
model like the RBC one is able to outperform PPP. 
5  Conclusion 
Much of the literature on exchange rate determination is  based on PPP, with PPP being 
justified on the basis of the consumption opportunity set (frictionless commodity arbitrage), 
In contrast, the standard micro-economic equilibrium paradigm views relative prices-and. 
hence,  also exchange rates-as determined not just by consumption opportunity sets,  but 
also by marginal utilities.  We use regression analysis to test the RBC exchange rate model 
assuming homothetic,  state-independent power utility with constant time-preference pa-
rameters; we use levels,  an efficient estimation criteria, and Monte-carlo-based significance 
levels.  We  find that our model outperforms PPP; that is,  real spending and international 
differences in time preferences appear to have an influence on the real exchange rate, The exchange rate and PPP  14 
i\ppendix: Decomposition of changes in marginal utility 
In the derivation of the decomposition, below, we start from the total differential of marginal 
utility of nominal spending, Ak  =  Ak(Ck,Pk, Xk, t), and then substitute the definition Ak  = 
fJVk/ fJCk  as per equation (4).  In the thlrd line we use t.he definition of time preference, and 
also invoke the property fJVk/fJpkj  =  -CkjfJVk/fJCk  (Roy's Identity).  We next. use the rule 
for differentiating a product and the definition of (ks.  Finally, we bring out the percentage 
changes  in the budget and the prices,  rearrange,  and  use  the definitions of relative risk 
aversion 'f/  and of total and marginal inflation: 
(AI) 
Substitution of (AI) into (1)  then gives  (5). The exchange rate and PPP  15 




/30  (E - 3) 
/3k 
/3us 
/30  (E - 3) 
/3k 
/3us 
/30  (E-3) 
/3k 
/3lTS 
/30  (E - 3) 
{ 
•  estimate 
•  std. error 
•  t-stat 
Two-sided confidence intervals for  t-statistic 
under three alternative null hypothesis 
ARIMA  I  ppp  I Generalized PPP 
Deutsche Mark (p  =  0809, R2  =  0.913  DW =  1 766) 
-1.361  10%  -1.4238  1.3678  *  -1.4543  1.4824  *  -1.5026  1.5294 
0.350  5%  -1.8071  1.782  *  -1.861  1.9053  *  -1.872  2.0048 
-3.889  1%  -2.6145  2.6688  *  -2.6999  2.6906  *  -2.631  3.0556 
4.909  10%  -1.5457  1.5013  *  -1.393  1.3616  *  -1.3605  1.3356 
1.220  5%  -1.9639  1.9697  *  -1.7605  1.743  *  -1.7753  1.7771 
4.025  1%  -2.7592  2.8371  *  -2.5636  2.5052  *  -2.6348  2.8066 
7.333  10%  -1.5999  1.6167  *  -1.6675  1.4276  *  -1.704  1.4903 
1.638  5%  -2.1142  2.1225  *  -2.1488  1.8659  *  -2.1656  1.9418 
4.476  1%  -2.8536  2.9706  *  -3.0877  2.5962  *  -2.9974  2.8354 
British Pound (p  =  0.749 , R2  =  0.878  DW =  1.25)  , 
-0.449  10%  -1.4864  1.408  -1.3621  1.4523  -1.2772  1.294 
0.848  5%  -1.9068  1.8204  -1.7429  1.8496  -1.649  1.6888 
-0.529  1%  -2.9316  2.8013  -2.7553  2.754  -2.9051  2.7175 
2.255  10%  -1.4444  1.4277  *  -1.3802  1.3952  *  -1.3431  1.2993 
1.157  5%  -1.8311  1.8053  *  -1.7866  1.7736  *  -1.7744  1.7239 
1.949  1%  -2.8189  2.8311  -2.7591  2.6863  -3.2453  3.0464 
3.861  10%  -1.6305  1.6711  *  -1.6244  1.6426  *  -2.0088  1.9769 
1.219  5%  -2.0951  2.1556  *  -2.1509  2.1161  *  -2.543  2.538 
3.167  1%  -2.9844  2.9877  *  -3.1726  2.9394  *  -3.574  3.6704 
Japanese Yen (p  =  0.870. R2  =  0947, DW =  1.824) 
3.256  10%  -1.7155  1.6789  -1.5112  1.4351  *  -1.3952  1.3958 
2.064  5%  -2.1117  2.1973  -1.9593  1.8868  -1.9177  1.9399 
1.577  1%  -2.9803  3.5422  -2.9972  2.9878  -4.2616  4.4349 
8.561  10%  -l..5926  1.6029  *  -1.4.537  1.4133  *  -1.2798  1.2714 
2.792  5%  -2.0162  2.047  *  -1.8997  1.8466  *  -1.7776  1.8421 
3.066  1%  -3.0776  2.9235  *  -2.8317  2.7139  *  -3.016  3.411 
2.717  10%  -1.7719  1.7438  -1.7478  1.6903  -1.7437  1.8014 
2.490  5%  -2.2415  2.2037  -2.3547  2.2102  -2.2049  2.2714 
1.091  1%  -3.178  3.1823  -3.2268  3.2893  -3.3929  3.3628 
Swiss Franc (p  =  0.787  R2  =  0883  DW =  1664)  , 
1.851  10%  -1.5963  1.5943  *  -1.4874  1.4531  *  -1.4829  1.5268 
0.842  5%  -2.032  2.0554  *  -1.8319  1.85.5  *  -1.9734  1.9875 
2.199  1%  -2.8545  3.057  -2 ..  5657  2.8291  -3.2503  3.2773 
4.304  10%  -1.5979  1.6075  *  -1.4491  1.4611  *  -1.5009  1.3872 
1.219  5%  -2.0257  2.0258  *  -1.8264  1.8425  *  -1.9731  1.8311 
3.532  1%  -2.837  2.9465  *  -2.5078  2.6509  *  -3.286  2.9526 
3.171  1070  -1.7438  1.7632  *  -1.6633  l..5952  *  -2.063  1.64:)2 
1.616  5%  -2.2912  2.2043  -2.14  2.0368  -2.6023  2.2288 
1.963  1%  -3.0705  3.12,56  -3.0278  3.1257  -3.6843  3.1924 
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Notes for Table 1 
The table reports results from estimating equation (8)  using Seemingly unrelated Nonlinear Least 
Squares without any cross-equation constraints on (3us.  The reference country is the US, the foreign 
countries (k)  are Germany, UK,  Japan, and Switzerland.  The log level of each real exchange rate, 
In[S(t)TIdt)/TIus(t)], is regressed on a constant, a time trend (whose coefficient,  (30,  estimates the 
difference in impatience), and the log of domestic and foreign real  consumptions, In[Cdt)/Ih(t)], 
whose  coefficients  (3L  estimates relative  risk  aversion.  According  to the model,  0<  =  In[ek(l -
1)d/(l -1)Us)](> 0),  f30  =  "us - "d  ~O),  (3us  =  1)Us(> 0), and (3k  =  1)k(>  0).  Also included in the 
regression is the beginning-of-period deviation between the exchange rate and its theoretical value), 
and lagged changes in the regressors and regressand.  Data are quarterly,  1974:04  to 1996:02  (87 
data points after correcting for  lags), from  IPS.  Exchange rates are end-of-quarter.  Consumption 
Ck  is  private consumption, IIk  is the end-of-quarter CPr. The header for  each country panel shows 
the autocorrelation in the deviation from  the long-run model,  p,  the R2  corrected for  degrees of 
freedom, and the Durbin-Watson statistic, DW. The body of each country-panel shows the estimated 
coefficients of the long-run model for  the exchange rate, as well  as confidence intervals for  the t-
statistics, two-sided,  for  20<  =  10,  5,  and 1 percent.  These confidence intervals are obtained from 
Monte-Carlo simulations, as  explained in the text.  Asterisks beside an interval indicate that the 
observed t-statistic is outside the interval-that is, the assumed data-generating process is rejected. The exchange rate and PPP  17 
Table 2:  Regression with f3us  restricted to be equal across all countries 
coeff 
fA 
!3o(E - 3) 
13k 
!3o(E - 3) 
13k 
!3o(E - 3) 
13k 
!3o(E - 3) 
Dus 
{ 
•  estimate 
•  std.  error 
•  t-stat 
Two-sided confidence intervals for I.-statistic 
under three alternative null hypothesis 
ARIMA  I  ppp  I Generalized PPP 
,  ,  Deutsche Mark (p = 0 827  R2  = 0913  DW = 1798) 
-1.401  10%  -1.45  1.396  *  -1.434  1.464 
0.381  5%  -1.837  1.838  *  -1.982  2.187 
-3.679  1%  -2.604  2.594  *  -4.001  5.442 
7.394  10%  -l.929  l.879  *  -2.167  2.099 
1.620  5%  -2.46  2.359  *  -2.89  2.745 
4.565  1%  -3.197  3.159  *  -4.273  4.22 
British Pound(p = 0.842, R2  = 0.878.  DW = 1.828) 
1.17  10%  -l.446  l.509  -l.934  2.148 
1.055  5%  -1.855  1.92  -2.567  2.737 
1.109  1%  -2.53  2.819  -3.848  4.055 
4.113  10%  -1.793  1.774  *  -2.796  2.982 
1.202  5%  -2.294  2.325  *  -3.598  3.79 
3.420  1%  -3.486  3.115  *  -5.674  5.884 
,  ,  Japanese Yen  (p  = 0.831  R2  = 0946  DW = 1 7.56) 
1.647  10%  -1.604  1.622  -1.628  1.703 
1.723  5%  -1.986  2.081  -2.233  2.283 
0.956  1%  -3.105  2.974  -3.52  3.87 
2.556  10%  -1.953  1.901  -1.898  2.009 
2.469  5%  -2.406  2.394  -2.424  2.681 
1.035  1%  -3.365  3.317  -3.736  3.95 
















-1.541  1.611  -2.555  2.581 
-1.982  2.065  -3.348  3.509 
-2.797  2.799  -5.022  5.539 
-2.011  1.915  *  -3.252  3.541 
-2.511  2.434  *  -4.301  4.473 
-3.444  3.396  -6.093  6.383 
-2.469  -2.922  2.8,55 







-1.509  1.544  * 
-2.002  1.977  * 
-2.846  2.794  * 
-2.096  1.843  * 
-2.574  2.378  * 
-3.524  3.3  * 
-1.3  1.302 
-1.761  1.727 
-2.761  2.766 
-2.098  2.035  * 
-2.697  2.624  * 
-3.853  3.701 
-1.312  1.343 
-1.734  1.811 
-1.312  3.496 
-1.876  1.851 
-2.456  2.419 
-3.479  3.488 
-1.445  1.417 
-1.899  1.857 
-2.82  2.709 
-2.228  1.829  * 
-2.766  2.385  * 
-3.931  3.466 
-1.898  1.981 
-2.362  2.419 
-3.374  3.346 
Please see  next page for notes to table  . The exchange rate and PPP  18 
Notes for Table 2 
The table reports results from  estimating equation (8)  using Seemingly Unrelated Nonlinear Least 
Squares with  the restriction that f3us  =  T/US(>  0)  must.  be  the same across  all countries.  The 
reference country is  the US,  the foreign countries (k)  are  Germany,  UK,  Japan, and Switzerland. 
The log level  of each real exchange rate,  In[S(t)Ilk(t)/Ilus(t)], is  regressed on a constant, a time 
trend (whose  coefficient,  /30,  estimates the difference  in impatience),  and the log of domestic and 
foreign  real  consumptions, In[C£(t)/Ildt)], whose  coefficients  /3L  estimates relative  risk  aversion. 
According to the model,  0< = In[lik(l - 'l)k)/(l- 'l)us)](> 0),  /30  = ous - Ok(  ~O), and /3k  = 'l)k(>  0). 
Also included in the regression is the beginning-of-period deviation between the exchange rate and its 
theoretical value, and lagged changes in the regressors and regressand.  Data are quarterly, 1974:04 
to 1996:02 (87 data points after correcting for  lags), from  IFS.  Exchange rates are end-of-quarter. 
Consumption Ck  is private consumption, Ilk is the end-of-quarter CPt The header for each country 
panel shows the autocorrelation in the deviation from  the long-run model,  p,  the R2  corrected for 
degrees of freedom,  and the Durbin-Watson statistic, DW.  The body of each country-panel shows 
the estimated coefficients of the long-run model for the exchange rate, as well as confidence intervals 
for the t-statistics, two-sided, for  20< = 10, 5,  and 1 percent. These confidence intervals are obtained 
from Monte-Carlo simulations, as explained in the text.  Asterisks beside an interval indicate that the 
observed t-statistic is outside the interval-that is, the assumed data-generating process is rejected. The exchange rate and PPP  19 
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